CVE-2026-77615: Opencast: Stored XSS in Paella player via WebVTT/DFXP caption cue text

## Summary The Opencast Paella player renders caption cue text into `innerHTML` without escaping. The captions canvas clears `_captionsContainer.innerHTML` and then appends each active cue with `_captionsContainer.innerHTML += cue`, so HTML inside a WebVTT or DFXP cue becomes live DOM and executes in the Opencast origin. The caption track is read from any media package element with a `captions/*` flavor and is served, with the player manifest, to anonymous viewers through `/search/episode.json`. The caption plugins that consume it are enabled in the default player configuration, the "Subtitles" upload that produces a `captions/source` track is active by default, and no caption processing step escapes the cue text. A user who can upload a subtitle to an event and publish it stores the payload in the published caption file. Any viewer who opens the event and turns captions on runs the script. Result: a non-admin content author stores JavaScript in a subtitle cue that executes in the browser session of every viewer who enables captions on that event, including anonymous viewers and authenticated staff. ## Affected opencast/opencast, `engage-paella-player` module. Supported release lines 19.x and 20.x are affected (and 18.x). Live-confirmed on 18.8 (Paella 7, paella-core 1.50.2) and 20.0 (Paella 8, paella-core 1.50.4); 19.5 ships the code-identical caption path (paella-core 1.50.4, same `EpisodeConversor` and default plugin config as 20.0). The captions canvas uses the same `innerHTML += cue` sink across these versions. Default configuration: the WebVTT and DFXP caption plugins are `enabled: true` in `etc/ui-config/mh_default_org/paella7/config.json`, the "Subtitles" upload option (`captions/source`, `.vtt`) is active in `etc/listproviders/event.upload.asset.options.properties`, and the `fast` workflow publishes `captions/*` to the engage player. Condition: an event with a caption track published to the engage player. No non-default flag required. ## Root cause The captions canvas appends each cue to `_captionsContainer.innerHTML` in the bundled paella-core (served at `/paellaN/ui/paella-player.js` / the 20.x core chunk), so markup in a cue becomes live DOM. The caption entry is built from any media package element whose flavor matches `captions/*` at `modules/engage-paella-player-7/src/js/EpisodeConversor.js:392`, and `/search/episode.json` serves the manifest and the caption file to anonymous clients. The WebVTT and DFXP plugins that consume it are enabled by default at `etc/ui-config/mh_default_org/paella7/config.json:571` and `:574`. The cue text is not HTML-escaped before assignment to `innerHTML`, and `partial-process-uploaded-captions` only cuts and tags the file, it never sanitizes it. Opencast sets neither a Content-Security-Policy nor an X-Content-Type-Options header, so the injected script runs without restriction. ## Reproduction Default config, default caption plugins enabled, a non-admin user with `ROLE_API_EVENTS_CREATE`, `ROLE_API_EVENTS_TRACK_EDIT`, and `ROLE_UI_TASKS_CREATE` (no `ROLE_ADMIN`). 1. As the non-admin user, create an event, then upload a WebVTT subtitle as `captions/source` whose cue text is an XSS payload, and publish the event. ``` WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:30.000 <img src=x onerror=document.title=window.__xss=document.domain> ``` 2. The anonymous search manifest then exposes the caption and serves the cue raw. ``` GET /search/episode.json?id=<event> "type":"captions/source", "url":".../static/.../x.vtt" GET .../static/.../x.vtt -> cue text returned verbatim ``` 3. Open the event in the player as an anonymous viewer, open the captions menu, and select the track; the cue is written to `innerHTML` and the `onerror` handler runs. Live-verified: on Opencast 18.8 (build 8705223) in Chrome, a non-admin author published the subtitle and an anonymous viewer enabled captions, rendering the cue as a live `<img>` node and setting `window.__xss` and `document.title` to `document.domain`. On Opencast 20.0 (build d919405, Paella 8), the served core bundle contains the identical `innerHTML += cue` sink and the player loads the cue raw; the sink executes JavaScript in the engage origin when fed the player's own published caption file. ## Impact - JavaScript execution in the Opencast origin in the session of any viewer who enables captions on the event. - Anonymous viewers and authenticated staff are equally affected; an instructor or admin viewer exposes that session context to the script. - Session and CSRF-token theft, actions performed as the victim against the Opencast REST API. - Stored by a non-admin content author, triggered by viewing with captions on, no attacker authentication at view time. ## Credit Jan Kahmen, [turingpoint](https://www.turingpoint.de) ([email protected])