CVE-2026-102992: piscina: Prototype-pollution gadget in ThreadPool.options allows RCE via execArgv / loadBalancer / env

### Summary A prototype-pollution gadget in `ThreadPool.options` allows an attacker who can pollute `Object.prototype` to execute arbitrary code in Piscina worker threads, invoke arbitrary functions during task scheduling, or inject environment variables into workers. The root cause is that `ThreadPool.options` is created as a plain object inheriting from `Object.prototype`, so any option without an explicit default in `kDefaultOptions` can be supplied via the prototype chain. ### Details In `src/index.ts` the `ThreadPool` constructor builds the resolved options object as a plain object: ```ts this.options = { ...kDefaultOptions, ...options, filename, maxQueue: 0 } ``` Because this object has `Object.prototype` as its prototype, reads for properties that are not own properties of the object and are not present in `kDefaultOptions` fall back to `Object.prototype`. This means a prototype-pollution primitive (e.g. from a vulnerable `merge()` or `JSON.parse` merge elsewhere in the application) can inject values for `execArgv`, `env`, `loadBalancer`, `argv`, `workerData`, `resourceLimits`, `niceIncrement`, `closeTimeout`, `recordTiming`, `stricterFIFO`, `workerHistogram`, and `trackUnmanagedFds`. The most serious gadget is `execArgv`, which is passed directly to `new Worker(..., { execArgv })`. An attacker can set `Object.prototype.execArgv = ['--require', '/tmp/attacker.js']`, causing every worker to preload and execute the attacker-controlled module on startup. This issue survived the fix for **GHSA-x9g3-xrwr-cwfg / CVE-2026-55388** ("Prototype Pollution Gadget → RCE via inherited options.filename"). That advisory hardened the `Piscina` constructor's `filename` read and `run()`'s `filename`/`name` reads, but `ThreadPool.options` itself was not created with a null prototype. The same class of attack is therefore still possible against any option without an explicit default in `kDefaultOptions`. ### PoC ```js import { resolve } from 'node:path' import Piscina from 'piscina' Object.prototype.execArgv = ['--require', '/tmp/attacker.js'] const pool = new Piscina({ filename: resolve(import.meta.dirname, 'worker.js'), minThreads: 1, maxThreads: 1, }) await pool.run(1) ``` `/tmp/attacker.js` is executed in the worker on startup. A full reproduction repository with `execArgv`, `loadBalancer`, and `env` vectors is available at https://github.com/Fcmam5/piscina-pp-poc. ### Impact - **Remote Code Execution**: via `execArgv` (arbitrary `--require` module preloaded in every worker on spawn). - **Arbitrary code execution in the main thread**: via `loadBalancer`, an attacker-supplied function that is called during task scheduling. - **Environment/CLI option injection**: via `env`, which is passed to each worker constructor. - **Denial of Service / unexpected behavior**: via other reachable options such as `workerData`, `resourceLimits`, `niceIncrement`, `closeTimeout`, `recordTiming`, etc. Anyone using Piscina in an application where `Object.prototype` can be polluted (e.g. through a dependency with a prototype-pollution vulnerability) is impacted.